This paper proposes a new framework to discuss self-control problems in the context of life-cycle health and longevity. Individual decisions are conceptualized as the partial control of impulsive desires of a short-run self by a rationally forward-looking long-run self. The short-run self strives for immediate gratification through consumption of health-neutral and unhealthy goods. The long-run self reflects the long-term consequences of unhealthy behavior on health outcomes and longevity and invests time and money to improve current and future health. The model is calibrated with data from the United States and used to provide an assessment of the impact of imperfect self-control on unhealthy consumption, health investments, lifetime health, and the age at death.
INTRODUCTION
Several manifestations of bounded rationality have been suggested to better explain health behavior (Cawley & Ruhm, 2012) but so far, the problem of limited self-control has not been analyzed in the context of an economic life cycle model of endogenous health and longevity. 1 A series of empirical studies have provided evidence for imperfect self-control as a driver of impulsive consumption and low investment in general (Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy,& Tyler, 2007; Baumeister, 2002; Shiv & Fedorikhin,1999) and as driver of unhealthy consumption such as overeating (Crescioni, Ehrlinger, Alquist, Con-lon, Baumeister, Schatschneider, & Dutton, 2011; Stutzer and Meier, 2016) , alcohol consumption (Lyvers, 2000) , and smoking (Daly, Delaney, & Baumeister, 2015; Fletcher, Deb, & Sindelar, 2009; Kan, 2007) . Inferences about causality, however, are difficult to obtain from empirical studies because there exists no counterfactual or treatment group.
Here, I suggest addressing this problem with counterfactual computational experiments. I integrate the dual-self model (Fudenberg & Levine, 2006) into the life cycle model of health deficit accumulation (Dalgaard & Strulik, 2014) , calibrate it for a Reference American, and then simulate behavior and health outcomes of the same person with perfect self-control.
The dual-self model formalizes the notion that humans are neither mere "cold" long-run planners nor mere "hot" affective persons by considering individuals consisting of a rational long-run self who partly controls the impulsive actions of a short-run self. The health deficit model is particularly suitable for the discussion of unhealthy behavior on the deterioration of bodily function and premature death. It uses a metric, the frailty index, which has been established in gerontology (based on Mitnitski, Mogilner, MacKnight, & Rockwood, 2002) and which allows for a straightforward calibration of the model. Calibrated with data on smoking as unhealthy consumption, the model suggests that the Reference American could live 4 to 8 years longer if he would not suffer from self-control problems and behave as the long-term planning agent assumed in conventional life-cycle models.
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STRULIK
THE MODEL
Consider an individual who derives utility from consuming health-neutral goods c and unhealthy goods u and faces the utility function
in which determines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and determines the elasticity of substitution between health neutral goods and unhealthy goods. The parameter determines the general desirability of unhealthy consumption and the parameter is a device to introduce abstention from unhealthy consumption, ≥ 0. Following Fudenberg and Levine (2006) , the individual is conceptualized as a dual self. The impulsive short-run self neglects the long-run consequences of consumption. It has access to liquid fundsw and maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraintw = c + qu, in which q is the relative price of unhealthy goods. Unhealthy consumption desired by the short-run self is then given by
and the desired health neutral consumption is c = c s ≡ (u + ). Unhealthy consumption is increasing in liquid funds and declining in the price of unhealthy goods q. By inserting u s and c s into (1), we obtain the immediate gratification U(c s , u s ) desired by the short-run self.
The long-run self faces the same utility function (1), plans life cycle decisions from now until death, and takes the impact of unhealthy consumption on health into account. The long-run self spends some income on health care and savings and faces the budget constraintk
in which k is financial wealth, r is the interest rate, w is nonfinancial income, h is health expenditure, and p is the relative price of health. As they age, individuals accumulate health deficits D at a natural rate . The speed of health deficit accumulation is reduced by health investments and increased by unhealthy consumption. The evolution of health deficits is given bẏ
The parameters A and determine the available medical technology. The parameter B determines the unhealthiness of u consumption. The individual dies at endogenous age T whenD > D(0) health deficits have been accumulated. The long-run self maximizes lifetime utility
The term in square brackets in (5) reflects the difference between the utility desired by the short-run self and actually experienced utility. The parameter measures the cost of self-control, that is, the expression [U(c s , u s ) − U(c, u)] measures the craving that the individual experiences when not conceding to the desires of the short-run self. For = 0, the individual has perfect self-control. The current value Hamiltonian associated with problem (1)- (5) is given by
The first order conditions with respect to consumption c, unhealthy consumption u, and health investments h are The first term on the right-hand side of condition (7) is the marginal utility experienced from consuming one unit of health neutral goods. If were zero, the right-hand side of (7) would be equal to the marginal cost of consuming one unit, consisting of foregone saving multiplied by the shadow price of capital k , as in the standard life cycle model. With limited self-control, > 0 and the right-hand side is smaller than the marginal cost of consumption. This means that the left-hand side is also smaller than in the corresponding standard model such that individuals, ceteris paribus, consume more and save less because marginal utility is declining with increasing consumption. Likewise, the first term in parentheses of condition (8) shows the marginal utility experienced from consuming one unit of the unhealthy good. If were zero, the second term in parentheses would be the marginal cost of consuming the unhealthy good, which accrues because of lower savings (marginal effect captured by k q) and because of the quicker accumulation of health deficits (marginal effect captured by D B). Note that D < 0 because health deficits contribute negatively to the objective function. With limited self-control, > 0 and individuals devalue the costs of unhealthy consumption. This means that they consume more unhealthy goods and experience lower marginal utility from consumption.
Condition (9) requires that the marginal cost of health expenditure, given by k p, is equal to the marginal benefit of health expenditure. The marginal benefit consists of the marginal impact on health deficit accumulation ( Ah − 1 ) multiplied by the contribution to the objective function of having one health deficit less (− D ). How exactly life cycle plans are affected by self-control can only be determined by numerical analysis. The constrained-optimal plan fulfills the first order conditions, the costate equations, and the boundary conditions 
CALIBRATION
The model is calibrated for an average 20-year-old American male in the year 2010. The Appendix contains the details of the calibration. All parameter values are summarized below Figure 1 . The benchmark specification of is related to Kovacs (2016) who estimates the temptation parameter for Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) preferences, which can be mapped into an estimate of . To see how, notice that maximizing
This means that our utility function is structurally identical with temptation preferences where ∕(1 + ) ≡ is the temptation parameter. Using consumer expenditure data for the United States, Kovacs (2016, In order to quantify unhealthy consumption, I conceptualize it as smoking and calibrate the non-predetermined parameters A, B, , , , , and jointly with such that the model predicts the actual accumulation of health deficits over a lifetime (as estimated by Mitnitski et al., 2002) ; death occurs at the moment whenD = 0.106 health deficits have been accumulated at an age of 77.1 years (male life expectancy in 2010); health expenditure matches health care expenditure of American men in 2010 at the age of 35 and 70 (MEPS, 2010) ; the Reference American spends on average $364 per year on the unhealthy good and quits smoking for good at age 45; and that consumption of the unhealthy good costs about 7 years of life.
The implied price elasticity of demand for the unhealthy good is −0.48, which is in the middle of the empirical estimates of the demand elasticity for cigarettes (Chaloupka & Warner, 2000) . As another plausibility check, I calculate the value of life (VOL) of the Reference American. The VOL uses an "util" u ′ (c) to convert lifetime utility into a monetary term. The benchmark calibration predicts a VOL of about $5.9 million at age 20. This value corresponds well to Murphy and Topel's (2006, fig. 3 ) estimate of a VOL of about $6.5 million for American men at age 20.
RESULTS
The life cycle health behavior of the Reference American is shown in Figure 1 by solid lines. Dots in the D panel indicate the actual health deficits at the specific ages according to Mitnitski et al. (2002) and dots in the h panel indicate actual health expenditure according to MEPS (2010) . High health expenditure at old age is financed by savings in middle age, as shown in the lower left panel. Unhealthy consumption is high when the Reference American is young and then falls steeply with increasing age, as shown in the lower right panel.
In order to asses what an estimated self-control value of = 0.25 means, I rerun the model and set = 0, that is, I impose unlimited self-control, and keep everything else from the benchmark calibration. The implied life cycle trajectories are shown by dashed lines. Given unlimited self-control, the Reference American reduces smoking and quits smoking earlier in life. Moreover, he saves substantially more and spends more on health, particularly in old age. As a consequence, he develops health deficits more slowly and dies later, at age 81.3. Thus, imperfect self-control costs the Reference American 4.2 life years.
The robustness of these findings is explored with a sensitivity analysis, shown in Table 1 . Case 1 repeats the benchmark run from Figure 1 . Without self-control problems, the individual would spend Δh∕h = 21.3% more on health, reduce unhealthy consumption by Δu∕u = 68.6%, and live ΔT = 5.4 years longer. Case 2 shows that for = 0.50, the individual would smoke about 65% less, spend about 1∕3 more on health, and live almost 8 years longer. If self-control declines further and = 1, as for Case 3, the individual would smoke more than 80% less if he had unlimited self-control. This result can be related to the study by Fletcher et al. (2009) who find that individuals assigned to a high-self-control group smoke 94% less than individuals assigned to a low-self-control group. If we thus conceptualize a value of = 1 (or higher) as low self-control and assume that the Reference American has average self-control, the implied would be closer to 0.5 than 0.25. Altogether, this suggests that the average American loses between 4 and 8 years of life lost due to self-control problems in consumption and health behavior.
Case 4 sets to −0.25 implying that the elasticity of substitution between unhealthy and health-neutral goods is 0.8 (instead of 2). It also implies a reduction of the price elasticity of demand for the unhealthy good to −0.32. The unhealthy The table shows the impact of self-control by reducing to zero; ΔT is measured in years, changes in unhealthy consumption Δu∕u and health expenditure Δh∕h are measured in percent.
good is now more complementary to ordinary consumption and thus reduced by less when self-control improves. If the Reference American had perfect self-control, u would decline by 33% and h increase by 13%, implying that together, 2.9 years of life could be saved by perfect self-control. Case 5 makes consumption less unhealthy by reducing B to 10 −7 , implying that 2.0 years of life could be saved by abstaining from unhealthy consumption. This value would be at the lower end of the empirical estimates for cigarettes and at the upper end of the estimates for alcohol. The calibration requires an increase of and a reduction of A because otherwise, the Reference American would consume the unhealthy good too much and/or live too long. With these adjustments, the transition to perfect self-control would save 2.0 years of life by reducing unhealthy consumption by 41% and increasing health expenditure by 23%.
Case 6 shows that prices play only a minor role. If we reduce the price of the unhealthy good by half, the outcome is similar as for the benchmark case, with a 72% reduction of unhealthy consumption and a 4.4-year gain in longevity from perfect self-control. Finally, we consider a reduction of liquid funds for spontaneous consumption. If only 10% (instead of 100%) of wage income were at disposal for consumption, the decline of unhealthy consumption would be 37% (instead of 45%) "only" 3.9 years of life could be gained from perfect self-control.
CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a dual-self life cycle model of endogenous health behavior and endogenous health outcomes in order to assess the role of limited self-control on longevity. The model suggests that about 4 to 8 years of life are lost due to limited self-control. If the price elasticity of the unhealthy good, or its unhealthiness is calibrated using values from the lower bound of empirical estimates, the model suggests a lower bound of about 2 years of life lost due to limited self-control.
A discussion paper (Strulik, 2018) includes further analyses on the role of income, liquid funds, and prices on health behavior and an extension towards self-control in physical exercise. It also discusses the related literature, limitations, and possible extensions. 
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APPENDIX A : SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
The costate equations for problem (1)- (2) are
The system (7)- (9) and (A1) to (A2) can be simplified by eliminating the costate variables. This leads to the following solution:ḣ
Otherwise,
with x ≡ (u + )∕c. Equation (A3) is the "Health Euler" for the lifetime trajectory of health expenditure, as derived and explained in Dalgaard and Strulik (2014) . The condition in (A4) determines whether individuals consume the unhealthy good. The unhealthy good is not consumed if it is sufficiently expensive (q is sufficiently high), or sufficiently harmful (B is sufficiently high), or if it is sufficiently little desired ( ∕(1 − ) is sufficiently high). Ceteris paribus, the unhealthy good, is more likely to be consumed if health neutral consumption is high (because the two goods are not perfect substitutes), if the price of health care p is low, and if health investment is low such that marginal return of health expenditure, Ah − 1 , is high. In this case, damages from unhealthy consumption are relatively cheaply repaired, which provides an incentive to make unhealthy consumption choices.
Inspection of (A5) shows that if the unhealthy good is consumed, higher q, p, B, and h lead to lower consumption whereas higher c induces more consumption, with the same intuition as provided with respect to the extensive margin. Equations (A4) and (A6) are the Euler equations for health neutral consumption. The standard Euler equation is augmented to take the effect from (potential) unhealthy consumption into account. For the special case of = 1, there is never an incentive for unhealthy consumption and (A4) is reduced to the standard Ramsey rulėc∕c = (r − )∕ .
An interesting feature of the reduced-form dynamic system (A3)-(A6) is that it is independent from . This does, of course, not mean that the solution is independent from self-control. Self-control enters through the terminal condition, which requires that the Hamiltonian at the time of death is zero, which can be equivalently written as in (A7):
Lower self-control, that is, higher , amplifies the negative impact of short-run desires U(c s , u s ) onH and it reduces the positive impact of savings and health deficit accumulation. From this, we expect that it leads to life cycle decisions resulting in a shorter life. Self-control thus affects the level of expenditure allocated to the two goods and savings and health expenditure but it does not affect the slope of life cycle trajectories, which are obtained from the Euler equations. Intuitively, it makes sense that the slope of life cycle trajectories is determined by intertemporal trade-offs faced by the long-run self, based on r, , and other prices, whereas short-run desires impact on the "within period" allocation, that is, on the level of the expenditure paths. How exactly life cycle plans are affected by self-control can only be determined by numerical analysis. The other boundary conditions are that the optimal life cycle trajectory has to fulfil are and D(T) =D, implying that the individual dies whenD health deficits have been accumulated.
APPENDIX B : DETAILS OF THE CALIBRATION
The model is calibrated to match initial deficits D 0 , final deficitsD, longevity T, and life-cycle health investments h(t) for 20-year-old U.S. American men in the year 2010. From Mitnitski et al. (2002) , I take the estimate for the rate of aging, = 0.043. I set r to 0.07 according to the long-run real interest rate (Jorda, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, & Taylor, 2017 ) and = r as in Dalgaard and Strulik (2014) . In the year 2010, the average life expectancy of a 20-year-old American male was 57.1 years, that is, the expected age at death was 77.1 (NVSS, 2014). From Mitnitski et al. (2002) , I infer terminal health deficitsD = D(75.6) = 0.106 and initial health deficits D(0) = D(20) = 0.0273. 2 In order to get an estimate of a, I assume that before the 20th century, the impact of medical technology on adult mortality was virtually zero. In the year 1900, the life expectancy of a 20-year-old American was 42 years (death at 62; Fries, 1980) , implying that a 20-year-old expected to live for 42 additional years. I set a such that a person who abstains from unhealthy consumption and has no access to life prolonging medical technology expects T = 42. From this value, I get the estimate a = 0.0135.
When the individual is between 20 and 65 years old, I set w = 27, 928, which is the average labor income for single men in the year 2010 (BLS, 2012) . For older individuals, I set w = 0.45 · 27, 928 using an average replacement rate of 0.45 from the OECD (2016). In order to assure that the savings motive is confined to that of health and consumption expenditure, I assume that the initial and final capital stock are zero. I assume that all labor income and pension payments are liquid but that capital income is illiquid, that is, for the benchmark casew = w. Furthermore, I normalize the price of health and the unhealthy good to unity, p = q = 1. This is an interesting benchmark case because it eliminates any price channel through which poor individuals may have an incentive to consume more unhealthy goods or spend less on health. We later investigate the sensitivity of results with respect to alternative prices.
Although the model is applicable for unhealthy consumption in general, we need to specify the unhealthy good for quantitative analysis. Because most of the available empirical literature on consumption of unhealthy goods is on cigarettes and tobacco, I begin with a calibration that tries to capture characteristics of cigarette consumption and investigate alternative assumptions with a sensitivity analysis. On average, single male Americans spent $364 on cigarettes in the year 2010 (BLS, 2012). Doll, Peto, Boreham, and Sutherland (2004) estimate that for men born between 1900 and 1930, cessation at age 60, 50, 40, or 30 gained, respectively, about 3, 6, 9, or 10 years of life expectancy. Jha, Ramasundarahettige, Landsman, Rostron, Thun, Anderson, and Peto (2013) arrive at an even higher estimate and suggest that life expectancy is shortened by more than 10 years among current smokers compared with those who have never smoked. Schauer, Malarcher, and Asman (2015) estimate that the mean age of cessation (of those who quit smoking) is about 40 years. Of course, some individuals never quit. According to the CDC (2002), 8% of American men aged 65 and over were smoking in the year 2010. These considerations illustrate that any calibration of a Reference American will be a compromise that tries to capture the essence of these stylized facts.
Obviously, the degree of self-control is difficult to quantify, mostly due to measurements problems. To deal with this problem, I consider the sensitivity of results with respect to this parameter. In an attempt to assess , I relate the benchmark specification to the estimate provided by Kovacs (2016) . This study estimates the temptation parameter for Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) preferences, which can be mapped into an estimate of . In order to see this, note that maximizing U(c, u) − [U(c s , u s ) − U (c, u) ] is the same as maximizing U(c, u) − 1+ U(c s , u s ). This means that the utility function is structurally identical with temptation preferences as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) , where ∕(1 + ) ≡ is the temptation parameter. Using consumer expenditure data for the United States, Kovacs (2016, table 5 ) estimates = 0.2, implying = 0.25. The remaining seven parameters, A, B, , , , , and , are calibrated jointly with such that (a) the model predicts the actual accumulation of health deficits over a lifetime (as estimated by Mitnitski et al., 2002) , (b) death occurs at the moment whenD health deficits have been accumulated at an age of 77.1 years, (c-d) health expenditure matches health care expenditure of American men in 2010 at the age of 35 and 70 (MEPS, 2010) , (e) the Reference American spends on average $364 per year on the unhealthy good, (f) the Reference American quits smoking for good at age 45, and (g) that consumption of the unhealthy good costs about 7 years of life. This leads to the estimates A = 0.00177, B = 3 · 10 −6 , = 0.365, = 0.19, = 0.5, = 650, and = 1.035. 3 The model is solved numerically by the relaxation algorithm (Trimborn, Koch, & Steger, 2008) . The method provides the solution of the nonlinear system up to a user specified approximation error (which is set to 10 −5 ).
